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Summary
The article reflects on the issue of the foreign policy strategy of modern Rus-
sia in the Balkans region. One of the most significant aspects of this problem 
is the difference in views between Russia and the West. Authors show how 
different interpretations of the events in former Yugoslavia in the 1990s and 
the beginning of the 2000s predetermined the sense of mutual suspicion and 
mistrust which spread to other regions such as the post-Soviet space. Explo-
ring differences between the Russian and the Western (Euro-Atlantic) views 
on the current matters, authors draw attention to fundamental differences in 
terminology: while the Western narrative promotes more narrow geographical 
and political definitions (such as the Western Balkan Six), traditional Russian 
experts are more inclined to wider or integral definitions such as “the Bal-
kans” and “Central and Southeast Europe”. Meanwhile none of these terms 
are applicable for analysis of the current trends such as the growing transit role 
of the Balkans region and its embedding in the European regional security ar-
chitecture. Therefore, a new definition is needed to overcome the differences 
in vision and better understand significant recent developments in the region. 
Conceptualizing major foreign policy events in Central and Southeast Europe 
during the last three decades (the 1990s, 2000s and 2010s), authors demon-
strate the significance of differences in tools and methods between the Soviet 
Union and the modern Russia. Permanent need for adaptation to changing 
political and security context led to inconsistence in Russian Balkan policy in 
the 1990s. Nevertheless, Russia was able to preserve an integral vision of the 
region and even to elaborate new transregional constructive projects, which in 
right political circumstances may promote stability and become beneficial for 
both Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community.
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Introduction
Fast-paced regional developments taking place in the international system have led 
to a reshaping of national borders, conflicts, regime change, and the setting of new 
international precedents, resulting in new and varied interpretations of historical 
and political processes. As Western scholarship has looked at the changes of regime 
and governments in Croatia and Serbia in 2000 as the beginning of democratisation 
and “normalisation” in the region (Buzan, Waever, 2003), the Russian scholarship 
sees this as the methods employed to arrange a coup d’état or an “orange revolu-
tion” (Ponomareva, Rjabinin, 2017). 
These divergent views between Western and Russian scholarship set difference 
of interpretation and perception of what was happening in the former Yugoslavia re-
gion in the 1990s and is happening now. Although both the West and Russia declare 
their commitment to the stabilisation and integrity of borders as they were shaped 
in the 1990s, in fact, finding common ground is impossible because of the irresol-
vable issues related to international precedents, such as Kosovo and other prece-
dents concerning the controversy between the principles of self-determination and 
territorial integrity. 
For instance, Russia does not accept the Western interpretation of the 1999 Ko-
sovo crisis which insists on the right of the ethnic minority group to rebel against 
central government. On the other hand, the Kosovo precedent as well the US inter-
vention in Bosnia in 1995, gave Russia a reason to name its actions in Georgia in 
2008 (regarding the protection of autonomy of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as well 
as the non-Georgian population of these autonomies) as a “peace enforcement” ope-
ration.1 Overall, methods and tools used by Russia might be regarded, to a large 
extent, as a “freestyle rethinking” of the concept of humanitarian intervention and 
peace enforcement, born in Bosnia in 1995 (operation “Deliberate force”) and in 
Kosovo in 1999 (operation “Noble Anvil”). The Crimea case of 2014, in this regard, 
might be seen as a contribution to a further rethinking of a peacekeeping concept, 
started, though, by UN-NATO peacekeeping missions in the 1990s. 
Russia’s actions in the post-Soviet space (as well as Russian involvement in 
Syria) have given rise to quite reasonable (but overblown) fears that Russia might 
want to project its influence to the other regions in the world, especially to the Bal-
kan region. Naming Russia a threat2 became a pretext for the EU and NATO to stir 
up their activities in the Balkans. The Berlin process was launched to bring the 
1 Хроника вооруженного конфликта в Южной Осетии (август 2008 года). РИА-Новости. 
08.08.2008. URL: https://ria.ru/20180808/1526017409.html (date of query: 10.08.2019).
2 Merkel Concerned about Russian Influence in the Balkans. Spiegel Online. 17.11.2014. URL: 
https://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/germany-worried-about-russian-influence-in-
the-balkans-a-1003427.html (date of query: 16.08.2019).
Entina, E., Pivovarenko, A., Russia’s Foreign Policy Evolution in the New Balkan Landscape
181
countries in the region closer to the EU. NATO’s increased activity has weakened 
Russia’s position, especially in Montenegro, which was fast-tracked into NATO 
membership in the summer of 2017, becoming its 29th member.
These blows happened as Russia began to review the Balkans’ place in its fo-
reign policy concept. The new concept does not mention the Balkans as a global 
player at all. Instead, it features such definitions as “Europe” and the “Euro-Atlantic 
Space”. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the region has completely lost its re-
levance to Russian foreign-policy makers, but, rather, it points out that the percep-
tion of its borders has changed, and that the new framework for Russia’s presence 
in Southeast Europe is beginning to take shape.
In addition to the Introduction and Conclusion, this paper consists of two main 
sections. The first section focuses on the geographical definition of the Balkans re-
gion and considers some of the approaches that are being used in Russian academic 
and foreign policy communities. Also it proposes a new definition of the region (the 
“Four-Seas Region”, рус. «Четырехморье») that might be applicable in reflect-
ing the actual developments that have been occurring since 2014. The second part 
analyses the imperatives of Russian foreign policy in three time periods (the 1990s, 
2000s and 2010s) and presents some quandaries that may exist in Russia’s foreign 
policy planning in the Southern Four-Seas Region in the near future. 
The New Balkan Landscape
In order to understand the place of the Balkans on the Russian foreign policy prior-
ity list, one has to outline the geographical boundaries of the region. This task has 
traditionally been very challenging for researchers. An existence of a great number 
of countries (from Italy and Austria in the west to Turkey in the south-east) involved 
in the region’s historical and political processes, both inside and outside the region, 
as well as a great number of dividing lines (historically not only between states but 
between imperial structures, integration projects, spheres of interest and even civi-
lization areas) even now makes it impossible to talk about clear boundaries in the 
same categories like, for example, in Scandinavia. As a rule, researchers use a set 
of provisional notions, such as the Balkans, Southeast Europe, Western Balkans, 
Western Balkan Six, including different sets of countries depending on the political 
contextualisation. Some of those notions are traditional for the Russian academic 
discourse. Others such as the Western Balkans and Western Balkan Six are bor-
rowed from Western scholarship and political narratives, and are de facto used by 
some representatives of Russian expert and analytical community.
Another question is whether the Balkans (Southeast Europe) can be classified 
as a separate region. The theorists (scholars) from the Copenhagen School, Barry 
Buzan and Ole Waever, answered this question negatively in the early 2000s be-
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cause there were no strong regional or global powers here, which would be the key 
political and security “stakeholder” (like the USA in the Western hemisphere and 
Russia in the post-Soviet territory). The military conflicts of the 1990s were inter-
preted by Buzan and Waever as an attempt to create an autonomous regional secu-
rity architecture, the central element of which, evidently, should have been the State 
Union of Serbia and Montenegro. International military intervention put an end to 
such attempts in 2000, and the regime change in Serbia (and in Croatia) was viewed 
as a step towards a more “European” (“normal”) order of things (Buzan, Waever, 
2003: 377-378, 395-396). 
Therefore, in the early 2000s, the Copenhagen School theorists described 
Southeast Europe as a sub-region, and as an integral part of the European regional 
security architecture. For them, the “Balkans” consisted of 8 countries: Croatia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, Macedonia, Al-
bania, Bulgaria, Romania and Greece. “Southeast Europe”, according to them, in-
cluded 12 countries: the “Balkans” plus Slovenia, Hungary, Turkey, and Cyprus 
(ibid.: 379).
The most commonly used concept among the Russian academia (namely, mod-
ern history, international relations, regional studies, and economics) is the concept 
of Central and Southeast Europe. It encompasses the countries of the former Yu-
goslavia, Visegrád Group, Bulgaria, Romania and, to a certain extent, Albania and 
Slovenia. This concept appeared during the “Cold War” and included all the coun-
tries which embraced the socialist way of life. In the late 1990s – early 2000s, 
the term Central and Southeast Europe was still in use. Researchers continued to 
put these countries in the same group for the purposes of studying the processes 
of economic transformation (Центрально-Восточная Европа, 2018) and in an at-
tempt to find commonalities related to their political transformation (Центрально-
Восточная Европа, 2015). 
Grouping them according to this principle left out such important players as 
Greece and Turkey, both of which fell under British and American influence and 
joined NATO in 1952 from the concept of Southeast Europe. What is also impor-
tant, is the civilisational component, meaning that the notion of Central and South-
east Europe included mostly Slavic countries. On the other hand, Hungary, Alba-
nia and even the Baltic States might be also included in the definition Central and 
Southeast Europe in its wider meanings.
It should be emphasised that the notion of Central and Southeast Europe (leav-
ing out Greece and Turkey) is typical of research focusing on the problems of the 
later part of the 20th century. If we look at the Balkan research of the 18th-19th cen-
turies, or the first half of the 20th century, then the notion of the “Balkans” would 
stretch from the Danubian Principalities in the East (Moldavia and Wallachia) to 
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Greece in the South, including, naturally, the area where the Austrian Empire comes 
close to the Ottoman Empire (Виноградов, 2004: 1-6). Therefore we can conclude 
that the academic understanding of the region adapts to the current political dyna-
mics and reflects the challenges faced by the academic community during a given 
historical period.
Today, we are confronted with new challenges to which we have to adapt for 
the following reasons: firstly, the breakup of the socialist bloc and the emergence 
of a whole new group of countries, instead of two federations, Czechoslovakia and 
Yugoslavia, which highlighted the differences in the political systems and culture. 
Today we cannot compare the processes of social, economic and political develop-
ment, for example, of Poland and Romania or Bulgaria and Bosnia and Herzego-
vina. Analysis of the current events within the sub-regional structures (for instance, 
the analysis of events in the Serbia-Macedonia-Kosovo triangle) are difficult to ap-
ply to the analysis of the relationship structure within the Visegrád Group.
Secondly, the completion of the economic transformation process in the coun-
tries of Central and Southeast Europe resulted in a deepening gap between Central 
European countries (the Visegrád Group as well as Slovenia and Croatia) and less 
prosperous Southeast, sub-regional countries (including the “Balkan Six”, Romania 
and Bulgaria).
Thirdly, there is a political demand to bring the Russian academic community 
in line with the policy makers in order to boost the quality of the country’s foreign 
policy. Southeast Europe is within the scope of The 4th European Department of the 
Russian Foreign Ministry.3 It deals with 12 countries: the “Balkan Six” (Albania, 
B&H, Serbia+autonomous Kosovo, Macedonia, and Montenegro), members of the 
latest European extensions (Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, Cyprus, and Croatia), as 
well as Greece and Turkey. Central European countries are dealt with by The 3rd 
European Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This division goes back 
to the times of the Russian Empire when the Balkan affairs were the responsibility 
of the Asian Department of the Foreign Ministry, while the European countries fell 
under the responsibility of a separate department.4 This might have been the reason 
why in 1946, when the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs was founded, Greece and 
Turkey were not “separated on paper” from Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Roma-
nia, and Albania, and were also put on a watch list of a separate FM department.
3 http://www.mid.ru/about/structure/central_office
4 Since 1832 the Department of External Relations dealt with European affairs and in 1847 it 
was turned into the Special Administration at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Asian affairs were 
the subject of operations of the Asian Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Rus-
sian empire created in 1819.
Croatian Political Science Review, Vol. 56, No. 3-4, 2019, pp. 179-199
184
This bring us to a conclusion, that one of the oddest things in describing the 
Russian foreign policy vision since the early 1990s, is the gap in understanding the 
regional complexities. The advent of a new geographical term, which reflects the 
course and nature of current political trends featuring its dynamic nature and the 
increasing presence of large international actors seeking to secure a strategic foot-
hold in the region, may become a step towards developing a specific foreign policy 
strategy among extra-regional global actors and a deeper academic and scholarly 
understanding of these processes.
New Geographical Positioning of the Region 
Based on the fact that 9 out of the 11 countries of the region (except Serbia and 
Northern Macedonia) have access to one of the four seas (the Adriatic, Ionian, Ae-
gean, and the Black Sea), it appears reasonable to use the term “Four-Seas Region” 
(рус. «Четырехморье»). An alternative term may be “Southern Four-Seas Region” 
(рус. «Южное четырехморье»).
Unlike many terms currently in use, the term “Four-Seas Region” is the least 
abstract. Unlike the term “Balkans”, it describes more clearly the geographical out-
line of the region clearly leaving beyond its borders the countries of Central Europe, 
specifically, the Visegrád Group, the majority of which have land borders. It reflects 
most appropriately the functional feature of the region’s geography – namely, the 
long coastline, running to more than 16700 km (not including the numerous Croatian 
islands). Finally, the Four-Seas Region most suitably reflects a number of the geo-
graphical and historical features typical of this region: its connection to the Mediter-
ranean basin and the actors historically present in it (Italy, Turkey, the UK and the 6th 
fleet of the US navy). The term “Four-Seas Region” may be used for analysing the 
political activity in and around China, which has established (or is establishing) its 
investment presence in Greece, Macedonia, Albania, Croatia, and Serbia. The term 
“Four-Seas Region” reflects Russia’s historical interests in this area whose strategic 
priority has been access to the Mediterranean Sea via the Balkans in order to expand 
its export opportunities and projection of power since the early 18th century.
The new term also reflects the fact that, after the end of the “Cold War” and 
the disappearance of the “Iron Curtain”, Greece and Turkey became involved in 
the Balkan affairs politically, socially and economically. For Greece, its “return” to 
the Balkans took place in 1993, which was marked by the problem of neighbour-
ing country’s name – Macedonia. The state failure crisis in Albania in the 1990s 
resulted in a labor migration to Greece, which was estimated to include as many 
as 480000 people in 2011.5 The migration crisis of 2015 clearly demonstrated the 
5 https://minorityrights.org/minorities/albanians/
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link between Greece and Turkey and other neighbouring countries in matters of lo-
gistics and how they are intertwined in the context of humanitarian challenges. Fi-
nally, Greece joining the rest of the Balkans is part of the EU conceptual planning: 
according to the European Union Macro-Regional Strategy, Greece, together with 
Italy and former Yugoslav republics, belongs to the Adriatic-Ionian (rather than 
Mediterranean) macro-region, which exists alongside the Baltic, Danubian and Al-
pine macro-regions (European Commission). Trans-regional transport system mo-
dernisation projects (Corridor X) do not exclude Greece at all; on the contrary, they 
make it the final destination of a long transit route. So, if the Balkans have become 
closer to Europe, Greece has become closer to the Balkans.
As far as Turkey is concerned, it has been involved in the Balkans since the 
beginning of the 1990s by participating in stabilisation missions in Bosnia and Ko-
sovo, growing investment and product turnover. From 2002 to 2016, the turnover of 
commodities between Turkey and the countries of the region grew from 3.6 billion 
USD to 16.2 billion USD (Ekinci, 2017: 9), additionally to infrastructure projects, 
such as the Belgrade-Sarajevo highway. The significance of Turkish cultural influ-
ence is clearly expressed in the building of mosques and cultural centres throughout 
the region (the largest ones are in Bar, Montenegro and Tirana, Albania). The Turk-
ish ethnic community, according to official data, may comprise around 100 thousand 
people across 9 countries (Buyuk, Clapp, Haxhiaj, 2019). Possibly, the key factor 
connecting Turkey with the Balkan peninsula is the gas-transport routes. Two gas 
pipelines at once – TurkStream (planned to bring into operation in late 2019-mid-
dle 2020)6 and TANAP (launched on 12 June 2018) – tapping into the TAP pipeline 
(the construction of which in Greece and Albania is now 88% complete).7 Therefore, 
Turkey will potentially collect in its territory the main energy assets of the region, 
granting the country considerable influence over the Balkan energy sector.
A clear link between the Turkish and the Balkan issues is evident from the con-
flict on the Cyprus gas dispute. The statement made by Cyprus in August 2019 that 
it is going to veto the EU enlargement in the Western Balkans if the EU does not 
help Cyprus in a dispute with Turkey shows that the Eastern Mediterranean agenda 
is getting closer to the Balkans (Greek Cyprus..., 2019).
Perhaps, uniting Southeast and Central Europe into one group will acquire 
relevance in the mid-term, if one of the Central European infrastructure projects 
is implemented and the territory from the Baltic to the Adriatic Sea becomes one 
common space. Today, we can single out several such projects, including the EU 
strategy to create a network of gas inter-connectors as part of the Three-Seas Ini-
6 https://www.gazprom.com/projects/turk-stream/ 
7 https://www.tap-ag.com/pipeline-construction/project-progress
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tiative (Cross-Border Energy Cooperation..., 2018: 10), the EU strategy to turn the 
Danube into a single transport space (Danube Connectivity), the modernisation of 
Corridor X, the Chinese 16+1 format. However, these processes are not pre-de-
termined. The shortage of structural initiatives on the part of the EU, the deepen-
ing gap between “more successful” and “less successful” countries (the concept 
of “two-gear Europe”), strengthened competition between China and the US and 
its winding up to a zero-sum game logic – all that may slow down the integration 
processes in Southeast Europe and put their EU membership on hold. Therefore, 
the differences between Central Europe and Southeast Europe will deepen, which 
will bring the “Four-Seas Region” concept to the fore, which includes those coun-
tries worst hit by political, humanitarian and economic challenges in the past 28 
years.
Russia’s Strategy in the Four-Seas Region
Russia’s Strategy in the 1990s 
In order to understand Russia’s strategy in the region in the 1990s, 2000s and 2010s, 
it is necessary to say a few words about the general logic behind Russia’s foreign 
policy today. This appears important because very often Western experts and politi-
cians habitually perceive Russian foreign policy as a reflection of Soviet diplomatic 
practices, and sometimes even as an attempt to reincarnate the Soviet Union; how-
ever, a number of key factors prove to the contrary of this perception.
Indeed, Russia declared itself not to be the successor of the USSR, but, rather, 
its follower. Having assumed this role, Russia undertook the task of single-hand-
edly paying off all of Soviet debts, but also remained a permanent member of the 
UN Security Council (with the right to veto), kept all its nuclear weapons, inheri-
ted all the foreign assets, membership in all international organisations where the 
USSR had been a member, and remained signatory to all its international treaties.
One can say that de facto, under this scheme, all the other republics left the 
USSR, but Russia did not, even though it agreed to the Soviet Union’s self-liqui-
dation. It seems that the Russian Federation gave up the socialist ambitions and 
planned economy and, at the same time, inherited all the international legacy of the 
Soviet Union and its international posturing. Maybe this is the cause of many prob-
lems that Russia is now facing internationally. However, as far as the country’s fo-
reign policy goes, Russia gave up, consciously or unconsciously, most of the power-
ful tools formerly used by the USSR.
During the Soviet era, the communist ideology practiced by the state had an 
enormous “soft power”. Around it, the USSR brought on board the whole of Eastern 
Europe. It built the socialist camp. It brought the socialist countries into the Warsaw 
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Pact, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance and the Council for Mutual Economic As-
sistance. It roped in a large group of Asian, African and Latin American countries 
through the socialist development concept.
Having abandoned the USSR’s ideological baggage, Russia could not, and 
would not, try to preserve the systemic mechanism of influence on international af-
fairs which the USSR had used. The Soviet Union had always viewed diplomacy as 
a minor tool. The party-to-party ties played the most important role. The USSR was 
a partisan state in which power and resources were concentrated in the hands of the 
party elite. All socialist camp and socialist allegiance countries worked by the same 
rules. The nexus between party elites ensured, globally, efficient and effective inter-
national ties. Via the international party channels, the USSR could facilitate critical 
decision-making, coordination and unity of efforts. Since the creation of the CIS, 
the tendency to establish cooperation through special relationships with the party 
and government leaders remains. But these tools are not as powerful as they used to 
be. Dominance of party relationships in the power hierarchy pre-determined the im-
portance of global networks of influence of that time – the Communist International 
and close interaction with the communist parties of Western countries. Moreover, 
the USSR had at its disposal non-governmental organisations, both national and 
international. All the pro-Soviet political powers had their own mass media. They 
were used as propaganda channels. They were the tools of influence.
Modern-day Russia has vague inter-party relations. Having no special ideo-
logy of its own, it has not been able to create global party networks under its aus-
pice. That task was not even considered. And it profited very little from joining the 
party projects and unions of other countries. Besides, Russia is still largely a misfit 
in global party structures. USSR-led international intergovernmental organisations 
have long been disbanded. International non-governmental organizations either fell 
apart or work autonomously. There is no foreign mass media at a global level con-
trolled by Russia. Therefore, despite the fact that Russia inherited the international 
legacy from the USSR and de facto owns it, it cannot be applied in practice, because 
it is either impossible or counterproductive.
The various outcomes of the “Cold War” and the different perception of these 
outcomes by Russia and the West, seriously affected the formation of the Europe-
an, specifically, the Balkan line of Russian foreign policy after the breakup of the 
USSR. The end of the “Cold War” and the trust in the “gentlemen’s agreement” 
over the non-expansion of NATO achieved in Malta by Mikhail Gorbachev, the de-
sire to return to the Western cultural, philosophical and social community, which 
Russia historically considered itself to be part of, and de facto was (for example, 
Russia’s role in the Concert of Europe of the 19th century), shaped Russia’s attitude 
towards the Yugoslav crisis. Because of these assumptions, the traditional Soviet 
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instruments, political and ideological pressure and the projection of military force, 
were no longer in the Russian arsenal.
The functional difference between these two components must be underlined. 
As the political influence exercised via a global communist party network was prac-
tically impossible because of anti-communist politicians who came to power in the 
majority of Central-European and East-European countries, Russia still possessed 
some military capabilities (despite the withdrawal of the Western Task Force from 
Germany in the early 1990s).
The proof of such capabilities is the forced march conducted by the Russian 
peacekeeping forces to Pristina in June 1999, which may be tactically explained as 
an attempt to obtain its own sector in the peacekeeping mission in Kosovo, which 
was still being developed at the time. By doing so, Russia was hoping to get what 
it failed to get in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, where de jure and de facto 
Russian peacekeepers were under NATO command. However, the Russian peace-
keeping mission was not to continue and came to an abrupt end in 2003. This was 
the result of the lack of technical capabilities for sustaining its forces and the fact 
that in the early 2000s (same as in the early 1990s), Russian leaders, headed by 
V. Putin chose a path of cooperation with the US. This time, the stakes were on 
building a united front against international terrorism.
On the whole, the Russian policy in the Balkans in the 1990s was frequently 
characterised by Russian researchers as dependent, inconsistent and traitorous in 
relation to the Serbs who were seen as the pillar of the Russian influence in the Bal-
kans (Никифоров, 1999: 25). Not denying this point of view, we would like to note 
that this policy did bear some fruit.
The critical principle of the new Russia’s foreign policy in the Four-Seas Re-
gion was that Moscow did not have any objections against the recognition of the re-
publics which chose to leave the former Yugoslavia. Recognition by Moscow of the 
independence of Slovenia and Croatia provided the foundation for the development 
of normal intergovernmental relations with these countries starting from the second 
half of the 1990s until the first half of the 2010s. Russia supported, on the diplo-
matic level, the complex process of Skopje obtaining its independence and joining 
various international organisations (specifically, the Council of Europe).
Despite the fact that in June 1992 Russia introduced sanctions against the State 
Union of Serbia and Montenegro (Resolution No. 757 of the United Nations Secu-
rity Council) and on the whole implemented a disappointing policy with regard to 
the Serbs in the 1990s (who traditionally view Russia as their protector and ally), 
it quite quickly managed to restore its authority. The U-turn of the plane carrying 
E. M. Primakov over the Atlantic in 1999, Moscow’s negative view of NATO for-
ces bombing Serbia and Montenegro, and the march of the Russian paratroopers to 
Entina, E., Pivovarenko, A., Russia’s Foreign Policy Evolution in the New Balkan Landscape
189
Pristina and occupation of the Slatina airfield returned Russia into the public dis-
course as a consistent protector of Serbian interests. Despite the fact that the events 
of 5 October 2000 are seen in Russia as one of the first “orange” revolutions, it was 
Moscow who was able to persuade S. Milošević to recognise the results of the 5 
October 2000 events and the victory of democratic opposition. Then the foreign mi-
nister Ivanov was one of the first to congratulate V. Koštunica during the presiden-
tial elections. All of this enabled Russia to regain its position in the region. Having 
said that, despite the fact that the 1992 sanctions froze political, economic, scien-
tific and cultural connections with Belgrade, the period of the 1990s paradoxically 
returned the emotional closeness between the nations, helped to overcome the nega-
tive background existing during the “Cold War”, and laid the foundation for inter-
governmental bilateral Russian-Serbian relations which resulted in signing the 2013 
Declaration of Strategic Partnership (Декларация..., 2013).
Russia and the EU in the Four-Seas Region in the 2000s and 2010s
During the first half of the 2000s, it was typical of Russia’s foreign policy to see the 
European Union as a successful integration project. At the same time, before 2010, 
Russia had a lack of desire in implementing its own integration project. It is well-
known that the project of the Eurasian economic union was firstly presented by the 
president of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev in 1994 during a speech at Moscow 
State University, but the project was then put off discussing for 16 years.
As a result, Russia encouraged the Balkan countries’ desire to join the EU ig-
noring the fact that European integration can go hand-in-hand with NATO member-
ship. For that reason, Moscow turned a blind eye towards Albania and Croatia join-
ing NATO, which, in today’s context, may be seen as a hostile move. Having backed 
down from resolving regional security issues (except working in the UN Security 
Council on the issue of Kosovo and in the B&H Contact Group), Russia placed its 
bet on developing pragmatic, primarily economic relations with the region.
However, at the same time, relations between Russia and the West were gradu-
ally growing sour. The political starting point for this new spiral of tension is con-
ventionally seen in V. Putin’s Munich speech (10 February 2007) and the armed 
conflict in South Ossetia (7-16 August 2008). Another dividing point became the 
Ukrainian crisis. On 6 May 2014, the future president of Croatia, then acting De-
puty Secretary General of NATO Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović, on her facebook page 
expressed support for Ukraine in connection with “Russian aggression”.8 Simul-
8 Kolinda pred Ukrajinskim Barikadama. Hrvatska dužnosnica NATO-a slikala se na poprištu 
revolucije. Jutarnji List. 06.05.2014. URL: https://www.jutarnji.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/kolinda-
pred-ukrajinskim-barikadama-hrvatska-duznosnica-nato-a-slikala-se-na-popristu-revoluci-
je/797554/ (date of query: 16.08.2019). 
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taneously, Germany initiated the Berlin process aimed at strengthening the EU’s 
position in the Balkans. At the end of 2014, Bulgaria’s non-constructive position 
put the South Stream project to an end. In autumn 2015, under the pretext of an at-
tempted (alleged) coup d’état, consolidation of Montenegro’s political efforts took 
place. These events resulted in Montenegro joining NATO on 5 June 2017. In paral-
lel, Serbia started leaning considerably towards the Euro-Atlantic alliance, by sign-
ing a logistical support agreement (NSPO Agreement) with NATO and hosting joint 
military exercises with the US and NATO (Double Eagle-2017 and Srbija-2018).
How can we assess the Russian economic presence in the Four-Seas Region 
in this political context? First of all, it cannot be denied that from the end of the 
1990s to 2012-2013, Russia implemented a number of strategic investment projects 
which strengthened its presence in the region. The “point of entrance” was Bulgaria 
and Romania. In 1998, Russia bought the controlling stake in the local oil refine-
ries (Petrotel in Romania and Burgas in Bulgaria), followed by the 3 billion USD 
worth of investments in the Bulgarian economy. In 2005-2008, Russian compa-
nies Lukoil, Zarubezhneft and Gazprom obtained a presence in Serbia, Macedo-
nia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina (Republika Srpska) by purchasing local compa-
nies (Bosanski Brod refinery, Naftna Industrija Srbije). On 15 February 2012, with 
acquiring Volksbank International financial group, the Russian Sberbank gained 
presence in seven countries of Central and Southeast Europe (the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Ukraine). On 23 May 
2013, Serbia and the Russian Railways signed an agreement for modernisation of 
railways planning to upgrade six sections of railway with the total length of 111 km, 
along with the purchase of Russian diesel trains.
It was not only Serbia which felt the dynamics of cooperation. Slovenia is the 
only republic of the former Yugoslavia which has a positive foreign trade balance 
with Russia. The share of Slovenian export to Russia accounts for 3.4%, which is 
considerably higher than the share of Germany, Italy and Hungary (about 1.9-2%).9 
It is quite logical that, despite supporting anti-Russia sanctions, Slovenia also con-
sistently promoted resuming the dialog with Russia. The visit of Russian President 
V. Putin to Slovenia on 30 July 2016 made Slovenia, together with Hungary, one of 
the EU countries that broke the circle of diplomatic isolation which started to form 
in the spring of 2014.
As the topic relates to Croatia, relations developed according to a slightly dif-
ferent scenario. A pragmatic bilateral relation got off to a good start during the 
late 1990s, followed by continued cooperation in the area of investment and tour-
ism, growing until 2012-2013. A failure of a number of ambitious projects (such as 
the purchase of some companies in Croatia by the Russian company Mechel) and 
9 https://oec.world/en/profile/country/svn/
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negative effect of the EU sanctions against Russia (the trade turnover between two 
countries reduced by almost half comparing to figures before 2014) to a large extent 
showed the limits for Russian presence in Croatia later on.10 Nevertheless, it is still 
considerable thanks to Fortenova (former Agrokor) where the Russian Sberbank 
and VTB, according to the results of the 2018 restructuring, are major shareholders 
(39.2% and 7.5% respectively).11
Looking back at the relationship between Russia and the EU in the Four-Seas 
Region one notices an amazing fact: despite the growth of political tension, Rus-
sian business was able to expand without any barriers from Brussels. A good illus-
tration of this is the fact that a 600 million EUR loan was granted by Sberbank to 
Agrokor in April 2014, three weeks after the Republic of Crimea joined Russia and 
the first package of sanctions was introduced by the European Union. It is hard to 
understand today whether such odd cases are the result of inflated expectations, un-
grounded hopes, strategic short-sightedness or tactical miscalculations both in Mos-
cow and in Brussels. It is also quite interesting to understand the reasons why such 
Russia’s vast economic presence became possible.
It is difficult to deny that Russian investments benefited the recipient countries 
substantially. They made up for the shortage of Western investments in fundamen-
tal infrastructure, they contributed to restoring enterprises damaged as a result of 
the military and economic shocks of the 1990s, they enabled the modernisation of 
production. It is sufficient to note that the productivity of the Brod refinery, which 
resumed its operations in 2008, grew from 1.2 million tons to 3 million tons per 
year by 2011. The building of Banatski Dvor underground gas storage led to the 
creation of new infrastructure in Serbia. The Serbia-Russian Railways partnership 
based on the loans provided by Russia to Serbia enables the improvement and mod-
ernisation of Serbia’s railway lines (which have always been a weak spot in the Bal-
kans). The presence of the Russian railway monopolist meets the interests of both 
the European Union which wants to upgrade the key transport corridor and of the 
Russian Railways, for which Serbia, just like South Africa, Iran, Vietnam, Indone-
sia, and the EAEU countries, is a country where Russian Railways are modernising 
and improving infrastructure. 
Another key circumstance is that at the time they had virtually no competi-
tion from Western-European capital, which in the 2000s and 2010s refrained from 
10 Sankcije prepolovile hrvatski izvoz u Rusiju, pogledajte tko su najveći gubitnici. Tportal.hr. 
17.04.2018. URL: https://www.tportal.hr/biznis/clanak/sankcije-prepolovile-hrvatski-izvoz-u-
rusiju-pogledajte-tko-su-najveci-gubitnici-foto-20180417 (date of query: 16.08.2019).
11 Российские госбанки получат почти половину крупнейшего ритейлера Хорватии. 
Ведомости. 04.07.2018. URL: https://www.vedomosti.ru/business/articles/2018/07/04/774656-
gosbanki-horvatii (date of query: 16.08.2019).
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any industrial investment when its position in the financial sector was weakened 
by the 2008 financial crisis. As a result, the opportunities presented for Russian 
capital strengthened Russia’s political foothold. Undoubtedly, Russian investments 
helped win back the leader of Republika Srpska, Milorad Dodik, who started his 
career in the beginning of the 2000s as a politician the EU and US were betting on 
(Энгельгардт, 2015: 176-177). Although Moscow has no illusions regarding the 
pro-Russian frame of mind of Serbian leader Aleksandar Vučić (Саморуков, 2019), 
it cannot be denied that numerous contracts made between Serbia and Russia (same 
as with Germany, Turkey and, since recently, France) keep Serbia from making a 
leap towards the Euro-Atlantic.
The situation with Agrokor may be interpreted in a similar manner. Although 
representatives of Sberbank insist that they want to sell its share in the corporation,12 
there are suspicions that the true motive of the Russian presence is to provide Rus-
sia with some leverage in the Eurozone which Croatia hopes to join in the near fu-
ture. Although there has been talk about “suspicious” Russian investments since 
2014, even in the current conditions, Moscow is still one of the few players ready 
to invest hundreds of millions of Euros in high-risk enterprises. It is quite possible 
that the situation will change over time – if the countries in the region are not able 
to provide friendly business environment that might attract Russian investment in 
the Four-Seas Region instead of in the other regions of the world or even in its own 
country. 
Russian Strategy Outlook
What happened after 2014, proved yet another neo-Marxist maxim: elites in pos-
session of political clout are capable of affecting economic processes too. Bulgaria 
came under pressure from the European Union, which resulted in Russia’s decision 
to stop the South Stream project on 1 December 2014. The South Stream failure, 
which was largely seen as a key project for Russia (for which, to a large extent, a lot 
of the infrastructure and financial instruments were made), showed that an insuffi-
cient effort was put into the political component of securing the Russian presence 
in Bulgaria. On the one hand, this may be understood as evidence of fuzzy thinking 
(and sometimes even carelessness) of Russia’s foreign policy makers in the 2000s, 
their refusal to bet on “soft power” (given that the technologies were far from per-
fect at the time). But it also may be interpreted as a hope that the Balkans may be-
come the point of convergence between Moscow and Brussels.
12 Sberbank to Sell Stake in Croatia’s Agrokor after Restructuring. Russia Business Today. 
20.03.2019. URL: https://russiabusinesstoday.com/economy/sberbank-to-sell-stake-in-croatias-
agrokor-after-restructuring/ (date of query: 10.07.2019).
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By conceding to the EU’s conditions related to the Third Energy Package (a 
political requirement for diversification of the gas supply mechanism), Russia ad-
mitted the vulnerability of its position in the Balkans. The reaction to those events 
was the new Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation adopted on 30 No-
vember 2016 in which the notions of the “Balkans” and “Southeast Europe” were 
excluded from the foundational documents. Instead, the new concept features such 
concepts as the “European Union”, “European Region”, “Euro-Atlantic Region” 
(Концепция внешней политики Российской Федерации, 2016).
Thus, the events of 2015-2016 resulted in a considerable reduction of Russian 
presence in the region. As a result, the Russian representatives have been increas-
ingly expressing concerns about NATO’s expansion in the Balkans.13 It should be 
noted that, under the current circumstances, the EU expansion also poses certain 
risks for Moscow because the EU common foreign-trade policy will most likely 
force the Balkan states to give up their trade with Russia (Саморуков, 2018). One 
of Brussels’ information requirements for Serbia was to join the sanctions which 
would have naturally resulted in a reduction of commodity turnover (7% of Serbian 
export and 6% of import to and from Russia – to the total of about 2.4 billion USD 
according to the 2017 data).14
Montenegro’s joining NATO and Macedonia’s upcoming membership did not 
result in an existential crisis of the Russian foreign policy and the damage to the 
reputation of Russian diplomacy was not as severe as it might have been. However, 
there is no doubt that Russia is reviewing the logic of its presence in the Balkans. 
Expert discussion is in progress. The traditionalist part of the expert field (mainly 
represented by those specialising in the Balkans) considers the Russian presence in 
the Balkans in the civilisational paradigm. It evaluates the necessity of a more ac-
tive political presence in the region as an important transit region populated by peo-
ple close to the Russian nation ethnically and culturally. Any form of forcing Rus-
sia out of the Balkans is unacceptable for this paradigm (Пономарева, 2017). The 
modernists represented by experts close to the Russian establishment think in more 
pragmatic categories. They claim that Russia’s presence in the Balkans is associated 
more with problems and risks than opportunities. Additionally, the Balkans, with all 
their embedded problems, are the sphere of influence of the EU. Therefore, the ab-
sence of Russia in the region is not a geopolitical failure, but an opportunity to get 
rid of the “problematic assets” and to focus on pursuing its foreign policy interests 
in more promising areas of the world (Лукьянов, 2018). 
13 Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s interview with the German newspaper Rheinische Post, 
published on 18 July 2019. URL: http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/meropriyatiya_s_uchastiem_
ministra/-/asset_publisher/xK1BhB2bUjd3/content/id/3728756 (date of query: 10.07.2019).
14 https://oec.world/en/profile/country/srb/
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As can be seen, the principal point of differences between these two views are 
the Russian prospects in the Balkan peninsula from the point of view of its future in 
macro-regional configurations. Today, we observe a combination of contradictory 
trends: growing transit importance of the region with its marginalisation in a social, 
economic and political sense. Russia’s attention to the region will depend on how 
these trends develop.
The realisation of the transit potential of the Four-Seas Region in connection 
with China’s efforts to build a logistical chain to Europe is a shared ambition: pub-
lished in the autumn of 2018, the EU Connectivity Strategy and modernisation of 
Corridor X demonstrate Brussels’ desire to find a path to Asia.
The marginalisation problem is related to the urging of the European centre to 
protect itself from the threats coming from the Mediterranean, scale down the social 
and economic tension existing in the Balkans, while avoiding large financial costs 
and sudden political moves. Here, a whole range of questions are raised, which Rus-
sia also wants to answer. When can we expect new countries to join the EU (accord-
ing to “Juncker’s Plan”)? What will the relations between Russia and EU be like in 
the mid-term (for example, in the middle of the 2020s)? The third, and not least im-
portant, question is whether the EU is capable of implementing a common foreign 
policy in relation to the countries of the region or will relations increasingly deve-
lop towards a conglomerate of national policies and bilateral (including behind-the-
scenes) agreements. The position of France and the Netherlands which are skeptical 
about the EU expanding in the Balkans contradicts the position of the pro-expansion-
ists (for example, Italy). Expansion is also supported by the UK and the US, whose 
interests are not shared by the continental EU. Another important question is the 
attitude to religious extremism and the refugee problem, which is posed by certain 
political forces (such as Alternative for Germany). The answers to these questions 
overall will determine whether the Balkans will become full-fledged members of the 
European family with prospects of development or whether they are set to remain on 
the semi-periphery, a territory of competition among global players. The answers to 
these questions will undoubtedly determine the logic of Russia’s actions in the com-
ing period.
Viewing the Four-Seas Region as an integral system with its own connectivi-
ties, we can come to the conclusion that if Russia’s presence in the region is brought 
to a minimum, which is what the EU is trying to achieve, this will not mean that all 
of Brussels’ problems there will be resolved. Firstly, a certain closeness of Russia 
to the Balkan region will remain regardless. It will be supported by both the sense 
of historical and cultural unity and Brussels’ objective interest in external invest-
ments. The companies engaged in modernising the transport infrastructure (Russian 
Railways in Serbia) will most likely continue their work. Besides, reducing the Rus-
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sian presence in the area is not a cure-all solution. Reducing the specific share of 
the Russian investment will result in a larger investment presence of China, Turkey, 
the US and other countries who are “external players” in relation to the EU. These 
countries may include the UK who is now considering expanding its own economic 
and political presence. Brussels will probably have to decide on its own which of 
these partnerships is most profitable for it and does not pose any threat.
However maybe in these circumstances partnership with Russia may become 
not as horrible as it has been depicted by a common narrative since 2014. By chan-
ging its position regarding Russian gas, Brussels informally admitted that without 
the Russian energy export it is difficult to procure the stability of the economies of 
the Four-Seas Region which suffer from a shortage of cheap energy. It is probably 
also a method of striking a balance between the US and Turkey, who are playing their 
own games in the region, thus destabilizing the situation (the Cyprus gas dispute) 
and China’s continued economic expansion in Europe. It is hard to say anything 
definite about a TurkStream project before the end of the construction of the route 
via Bulgaria. However, if it becomes a reality, it will be able to close a whole range 
of differences dogging the relationship between Russia and the EU in recent years.
Moscow is placing a huge bet on TurkStream project scheduled to be launched 
in 2020-2022.15 Moscow’s relatively quick agreement with the Third Energy Pack-
age requirements and the delegation of considerable powers related to transit to Tur-
key (which hopes to monopolize major regional logistical chains) was a forced step. 
It reflects Moscow’s interest in expanding exports and the diversification of supply 
routes. Development of TurkStream, which started on 7 February 2015, nine years 
after closing the South Stream, demonstrates Moscow’s high adaptability and flexi-
bility in relations with the EU.
No matter what Russia’s further actions are, it would be a gross simplification 
to consider its foreign policy within the logic of civilisational closeness. From 10 
to 15% of Russia’s population (according to different data) practice Islam. To some 
extent, the relationship between Russia and Turkey is better than its relationships 
with Orthodox Romania, Bulgaria, Montenegro, and Georgia whom Russia freed 
from the Ottoman oppression in the 19th century.16 In this respect, the fact that Rus-
sia’s strategic partners include Orthodox Serbia is rather an exception to the rule.
In this respect, a strategic partnership with Serbia based on economic coopera-
tion, supplies of arms and other technical products is not a consequence of civili-
15 «Газпром» сделал трубный выбор. Восточная Европа подтвердила маршрут «Турецкого 
потока». Коммерсант. 22.11.2018. URL: https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3806415 (date of 
query: 02.03.2020).
16 In summer 2018 all these countries joined the demarche by Great Britain and expelled Rus-
sian diplomats due to “the Skripal case”.
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sational and religious closeness, but rather a result of the foreign policy doctrine 
chosen by Belgrade, which states that its interests do not lie just in the West, but in 
the East as well.
When describing Russia’s policy in the Middle East as an example, it should 
be mentioned that Russia is capable of maintaining working relationships with po-
litical players who have the exact opposite interests (Israel, Iran, Turkey, the Gulf 
countries). It is quite possible that we will see something similar in the Four-Seas 
Region one day. The meeting between Vladimir Putin and Hashim Thaçi on 17 No-
vember 2018 based on the mutual desire of both parties, demonstrates that Russia is 
not taking the Albanian direction off its agenda. Opening air traffic with Albania in 
the summer of 2019 (by Ural Airlines) shows that Russian private investment may 
not be limited to the Montenegro coast alone. Moreover, the relations between Rus-
sia and Albania, excluding the Kosovo issue, in recent years were to a least extent 
subject to diplomatic crises of all the Balkan countries and developed incremen-
tally. Even now, unlike Brussels, Moscow is not inclined to see dividing lines in the 
region between EU members and applicants. The expansion of NATO may be bad 
news for the supporters of the civilisational theory, but it will also serve as a stimu-
lus for Russian policy makers to find new, more creative ways of implementing the 
current foreign-policy doctrine aimed at strengthening sovereignty and boosting 
multipolarity.
Conclusion
Understanding foreign policy today, involves facing a certain number of methodo-
logical, political and existential challenges caused by the rapidly changing situ-
ation in the world since 2014, the Russia-West crisis, and the destruction of the sta-
tus quo created in the 2000s.
Having faced the risk of losing all the achievements reached in the 2000s, 
Russia is developing a wider set of tools for implementing its own foreign policy. 
Russia’s exclusion from the majority of political and economic processes in the Eu-
ropean Union allows it not to be bound by ideological and opportunistic conven-
tions. Among Russian foreign policy makers (as well as among Russian foreign 
policy thinkers) and academic community there is an understanding that Russia 
has a unique configuration of relations with each country in the Four-Seas Region, 
drawing on the similarities and differences of historic fate and fortunes, civilisa-
tional closeness, the scale of joint economic projects, and political interests. At the 
same time, with each of these countries Russia is bound by something more than 
just pragmatic economic interests and the political situation.
The potential of these relations is huge. It has not yet been fully understood 
or studied. One thing is beyond doubt: this potential is being poorly used, insuffi-
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ciently and inefficiently. Besides, Russia could give so much to the region in very 
different dimensions, both in terms of economic development and strengthening 
security, political stability, settling differences, and making peace between various 
ethnic groups.
If the circumstances change, this potential may remain untapped. However, 
that will require conscious efforts from both sides – both on the part of Moscow and 
on the part of the countries and political circles of the Four-Seas Region. We clearly 
need a new pro-active policy.
In the 1990s and 2000s, Russia simply trusted that joining the EU would solve 
all the problems in the Balkans. And partnership with the EU would serve as the 
guarantee of Russia’s peaceful, positive presence in the region and the development 
of multifaceted and mutually beneficial connections. Unfortunately, none of that 
has happened. On the contrary, the opposition between Moscow and Brussels is 
projected on the regional matters.
Evidently, this trend must be turned around. All nations in the triangle Russia-
Four-Seas Region-EU are interested in a shift of policy. But it will require giving up 
past taboos, ideas and prejudice, whoever supports them, and building a new future 
together.
REFERENCES
Buyuk, Hamdi Firat; Clapp, Alexander; Haxhiaj, Serbeze. 2019. Diaspora Politics: Tur-
key’s New Balkan Ambassadors. Available at https://balkaninsight.com/2019/03/19/
diaspora-politics-turkeys-new-balkan-ambassadors/ (accessed 14 August 2019).
Buzan, Barry; Waever, Ole. 2003. Regions and Powers. The Structure of International 
Security. Cambridge University Press. New York.
Концепция внешней политики Российской Федерации [Concept of Russian Foreign 
Policy]. 2016. Available at http://kremlin.ru/acts/bank/41451 (accessed 6 August 
2019).
Cross-border energy cooperation in Central Europe. 2018. CEEP Policy Paper. Avail-
able at https://www.ceep.be/policy-paper-cross-border-energy-cooperation-in-cen-
tral-europe-towards-flexible-secure-and-sustainable-regional-energy-markets/ (ac-
cessed 15 August 2019).
Декларация о стратегическом партнёрстве между Российской Федерацией и 
Республикой Сербией [Declaration of Strategic Partnership between the Russian 
Federation and the Republic of Serbia]. 2013. Available at http://kremlin.ru/supple-
ment/1461 (accessed 16 August 2019).
Croatian Political Science Review, Vol. 56, No. 3-4, 2019, pp. 179-199
198
Ekinci, Mehmet Uğur. 2017. Türkiye-Balkanlar İlişkileri. Available at https://www.se-
tav.org/turkiye-balkanlar-iliskileri/ (accessed 15 August 2019).
Энгельгардт, Георгий Николаевич. 2015. Республика Сербская в Боснии и 
Герцеговине. Возникновение и эволюция (1990–2006 гг.). Диссертация 
на соискание ученой степени кандидата исторических наук. Институт 
славяноведения РАН. Москва. [Engelgardt, Georgi. 2015. Republika Srpska in 
Bosnia and Hercegovina. Genesis and Evolution (1990-2006). Dissertation for de-
gree in History. Institute of Slavonic Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences. Mos-
cow.] Available at https://inslav.ru/images/stories/other/2015_engelgardt_dissert-
acija.pdf (accessed 18 August 2019).
Greek Cyprus threatens to veto EU enlargement over row with Turkey. 2019. Available 
at https://www.dailysabah.com/eu-affairs/2019/06/18/greek-cyprus-threatens-to-ve-
to-eu-enlargement-over-row-with-turkey (accessed 14 August 2019).
If Croatia joins the Eurozone, it would give Russia its greatest weapon in Europe. 2019. 
Available at https://www.euronews.com/2019/01/22/if-croatia-joins-the-eurozone-
it-would-give-russia-its-greatest-weapon-in-europe-view (accessed 22 January 2019).
Куликова, Наталья Владимировна (ед.). 2018. Центрально-Восточная Европа в 
поисках новых источников развития. Институт экономики РАН. Москва. [Ku-
likova, Natalia (ed.). 2018. Central and Eastern Europe. In search for new potential 
for development. Institute of Economics, Russian Academy of Sciences. Moscow.]
Лукьянов, Федор. 2018. Ретро заказывали? За что на самом деле предложили 
голосовать жителям Македонии, Россия в глобальной политике, 02.09.2018. 
[Lukyanov, Fedor. 2018. Have you ordered retro? What was really proposed for 
voting to the citizens of Macedonia, Russia in Global Affairs, 02.09.2018.] Avail-
able at https://globalaffairs.ru/redcol/Retro-zakazyvali-19779 (accessed 16 August 
2019).
Никифоров, Константин Владимирович. 1999. Между Кремлем и Республикой 
Сербской (Боснийский кризис: завершающий этап). Институт славяноведения 
РАН. Москва. [Nikiforov, Konstantin. 1999. Between the Kremlin and Republika 
Srpska. The Bosnian Crisis: Final Phase. Institute of Slavonic Studies, Russian 
Academy of Sciences. Moscow.]
Никифоров, Константин Владимирович (ед.). 2015. Центральная и Юго-Восточная 
Европа. Конец XX – начало XXI вв. Аспекты общественно-политического 
развития. Историко-политологический справочник. Нестор-История. Москва, 
Санкт-Петербург. [Nikiforov, Konstantin (ed.). 2015. Central and South-East Eu-
rope. The End of XX – the Beginning of XXI Century. Aspects of Social and Political 
Development. Historical and Political Handbook. Nestor-Historia. Moscow, Saint-
Petersburg.]
Пономарева, Елена Георгиевна. 2017. Балканская политика Российской Федерации: 
в поисках потерянного времени?, in: 25 лет внешней политики России: сб. 
Entina, E., Pivovarenko, A., Russia’s Foreign Policy Evolution in the New Balkan Landscape
199
материалов Х Конвента РАМИ. 5 т. Т. 1. Внешняя политика России: глобальное 
и региональное измерения. В 2 ч. Ч. 1, с. 486-502. МГИМО-Университет. 
Москва. [Ponomareva, Elena. 2017. Balkan Policy of the Russian Federation: in 
Search of Lost Time?, in: 25 Years of Russia’s Foreign Policy: Materials of X RISA 
Convention. In 5 parts, part 1. Foreign Policy of Russia: Global and Regional Di-
mensions. Chapter 1. MGIMO-University. Moscow: 486-502.]
Ponomareva, Jelena; Rjabinin, Jevgenij. 2017. Obojene revolucije u kontekstu strategije 
kontrolisanog haosa, Argumenti, (XI) 30: 45-60.
Саморуков, Максим. 2018. Противоречия России и ЕС на Балканах. В чем они и 
можно ли их преодолеть. Московский центр Карнеги, 19.12.2018. [Samorukov, 
Maxim. 2018. Disagreements Russia-EU in the Balkans. Where are they and how 
to overcome them. Moscow Carnegie Center, 19.12.2018.] Available at https://car-
negie.ru/commentary/77961 (accessed 14 August 2019).
Саморуков, Максим. 2019. Почему Белград устал от российской поддержки. 
Московский центр Карнеги, 17.01.2019 [Samorukov, Maxim. 2019. Why Bel-
grade is tired of Russian support. Moscow Carnegie Center, 17.01.2019.] Available 
at https://carnegie.ru/commentary/78146 (accessed 14 August 2019).
The European Commission website, section of Macro-Regional Strategies. 2017. Avail-
able at http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/policy/cooperation/macro-regional-
strategies/ (accessed 23 September 2017).
Виноградов, Владилен Николевич (отв. ред.). 2004. История Балкан. Век 
восемнадцатый. Институт славяноведения РАН. Москва. [Vinogradov, Vla-
dylen (ed.). 2004. History of the Balkans. The Eighteenth Century. Institute of Sla-
vonic Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences. Moscow.]
Mailing Addresses: 
Ekaterina Entina, Department of International Relations, National Research Uni-
versity Higher School of Economics, Malaya Ordynka 17, 119017, Moscow, Rus-
sia. E-mail: e.entina@hse.ru
Alexander Pivovarenko, Institute of Slavonic Studies, Russian Academy of Scien-
ces, Leninsky Prospekt 32-A, 119334, Moscow, Russia. E-mail: aleksandar.a.p@ya.ru
Croatian Political Science Review, Vol. 56, No. 3-4, 2019, pp. 179-199
